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ABSTRACT
Owners of intellectual property or mere sponsors of an idea (e.g., authors, security issuers, sponsors
of standards) often need to persuade potential buyers or adopters of the worth of their property or
idea. To this purpose, they often resort to more or less independent certifiers. This paper analyzes
the strategic choice of certifiers in rival and non-rival situations in a three-stage game. First, the
owner/sponsor selects among potential certifiers. Certifiers differ in their degree of sympathy
towards the owner/sponsor's interests relative to their concern for quality delivered to the users.
Second, the certifier studies the offering and renders an opinion. The opinion consists of an
endorsement (or lack thereof) and, possibly, some further demands for changes involving prices or
offering characteristics. Third, the final users adopt or buy as a function of their perceived utility.
In this context, the choice of certifier involves a basic trade-off: trying a tougher certifier reduces
the probability of a positive opinion, but makes the users more likely to adopt the offering or willing
to pay more for it in case of a positive opinion by the certifier. The paper first analyzes the sponsor's
choices of certifier and design, as well as social preferences regarding these choices. More attractive
standards lead to more friendly certification and fewer concessions to users. Regulation cannot
improve on private choices in case of mildly attractive standards, and partial regulation reduces
social welfare in case of attractive standards. Furthermore, the sponsor can costlessly delegate the
design choice to the certifier when she can have her preferred choice of certifier, but must make
more concessions to users than she would want to if the spectrum of certifiers is limited. The paper
then extends the basic model to multiple categories of users, to the downstream presence of the
sponsor, and to within-user-group network externalities. Finally, it studies strategic forum shopping
by sponsors of competing standards.
Josh Lerner
Harvard Business School
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Owners of tangible or intangible property or mere sponsors of an idea need to persuade
potential buyers or adopters of the worth of their property or idea. To this purpose, they
often resort to more or less independent certiﬁers. Rather than just publishing works on
the web or in non-refereed books, academics typically submit their research to journals,
which vary in how demanding their standards are and in their sympathy for various topics.
Authors attempt to convince reputable publishing houses to print their work, and search
for endorsements from well-regarded peers. Issuers of bonds or stocks are eager to receive
certiﬁcation from investment banks, analysts, and rating agencies, which diﬀer in their
reputation and independence. Technology sponsors attempt to build standards around
their technologies by having them validated by standard setting organizations (SSOs) that
range from fully independent to largely captive special interest groups (SIG).
This paper is a ﬁrst pass at analyzing the strategic choice of certiﬁers in rival and
non-rival situations. It employs a three-stage game. First, the owner / sponsor selects
among potential certiﬁers. Certiﬁers diﬀer in their degree of sympathy towards the owner
/ sponsor’s interests relative to their concern for quality delivered to the users. Second,
the certiﬁer studies the oﬀering and renders an opinion. The opinion consists of an
endorsement (or lack thereof) and, possibly, some further demands for price changes
or adjustments of the oﬀering characteristics. Third, the ﬁnal users adopt or buy as a
function of their perceived utility.
In this context, the choice of certiﬁer involves a basic trade-oﬀ: trying a tougher
certiﬁer reduces the probability of a positive opinion, but makes the users more likely to
adopt the oﬀering or willing to pay more for it in case of a positive opinion by the certiﬁer.
Because we discuss some case study evidence from standard setting in the next section,
we couch the framework as one in which the certiﬁers are SSOs. But as the examples
provided above illustrate, the theoretical part of the paper has much broader applicability.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some further motivation by dis-
1cussing sponsors’ choice of SSOs. The theoretical part ﬁrst analyzes the sponsor’s choices
of certiﬁer and design, as well as social preferences regarding these choices (Sections 3 and
4). The paper then extends the basic model to multiple categories of users, to downstream
presence of the sponsor, and to within-user-group network externalities (Section 5). Fi-
nally it studies strategic forum shopping by sponsors of competing standards (Section 6).
Related literature
a) Literature on standards
Despite the copious research on standards, it is striking how little work has addressed
the question of how SSOs should be organized or how ﬁrms should choose between com-
peting SSOs. Many of the papers in the literature focus only on de facto standard setting,
where there is no role for a SSO in the model (e.g., Farrell and Saloner 1985). Alterna-
tively, a number of works, both in economics and political science, have focused on settings
where government bodies have played the key role in adjudicating between the desires of
diﬀerent parties about possible standards (e.g., Farrell and Shapiro 1992).
The economics literature analyzing SSOs has largely focused on just one role: that
of a meeting room, i.e., a setting where the parties can negotiate.1 The other roles
played by committees –such as facilitating information sharing, actively promoting design
compromises, and certifying new standards– are ignored. And there is no need for more
than one SSO in this setting, since the features of the SSO do not matter.
Farrell (1996) and Simcoe (2003) model the standard-setting process as a “war of
attrition” between two parties with their own proposed standards. As in the rest of
the literature, the various participants receive a larger share of the proﬁts if their own
standard is selected. Participants have private information about the quality of their
proposed standard. These papers show that ultimately, the higher-quality technology will
1For example, in Farrell and Saloner (1988), two ﬁrms can choose between two incompatible technolo-
gies. They can do so by repeatedly talking with each other (seen as akin to a SSO), by product market
competition (de facto standard setting in the marketplace), or a hybrid between the two approaches. The
authors show that the committee process is more likely to arrive at a high-value consensus than product
market competition, but that it usually takes longer. The hybrid approach is likely to dominate both of
the alternatives.
2be selected, but that the delays will be a function of the presence of vested interests.
In Simcoe’s model, which incorporates explicit voting by SSO participants, relaxing the
hurdle needed to approve a standard will reduce delay, but may also reduce the probability
that the best technology is selected. Reducing vested interests (e.g., by adopting rules that
limit the utilization of intellectual property used in standards) will reduce delays. When
vested interests are already quite high, or when the dispersion of quality is high enough,
decreasing vested interests will boost rather discourage the innovations undertaken by the
two ﬁrms.
The nature of SSO organizations, and the impact of these structures on the standards
selected, has attracted little empirical attention as well. Most of the empirical pieces
have been based on individual case studies (e.g., Sirbu-Zwimpfer 1985) or comparisons
of a small number of cases (Besen-Johnson 1985, Weiss-Sirbu 1990). They have largely
focused on a question somewhat diﬀerent from the one that we examine, namely the way
in which an individual SSO chooses between competing standards that rival ﬁrms are
championing.
b) Literature on ﬁnancial certiﬁcation
Many ﬁnancing decisions are characterized by insuﬃcient information held by poten-
tial investors, that may result in a breakdown of the market. A large literature in ﬁnancial
economics, beginning with Diamond (1984), has highlighted the importance of intermedi-
aries in certifying ﬁrms seeking to raise external ﬁnancing.2 Among the institutions whose
certiﬁcation role has been highlighted in theoretical and/or empirical studies have been
commercial and investment banks, venture capitalists, large-block shareholders, analysts,
auditors, and rating agencies.3 This literature has largely ignored the strategic choice of
2E.g., Admati-Pﬂeiderer (1994), Chemmanur-Fulghieri (1994), Lizzeri (1999), and Peyrache-Quesada
(2003).
3These intermediaries can play this role for three reasons. First, the intermediaries are able to gen-
erate intensive knowledge about the issuing ﬁrm due to their involvement with the ﬁrm. Second, the
intermediary must have acquired substantial reputational capital that it risks by certifying the ﬁrm. If
the ﬁrm subsequently proves to have misstated its potential, then the intermediary’s reputation capital
may be tarnished. Third, the intermediary may take a ﬁnancial stake in the ﬁrm.
3certiﬁers by ﬁrms (often assuming that the intermediary is a monopolist), as well as sev-
eral other issues considered in this paper. A notable exception is Morrison-White (2004),
in which banks apply to regulators with heterogenous abilities to screen. A successful ap-
plication allows banks to raise more deposits, all the more so as the regulator’s screening
ability is perceived as high. The focus and analysis in Morrison and White are rather
diﬀerent from ours, as their primary interest lies in examining the impact of international
ﬁnancial liberalization in allowing banks to beneﬁt from foreign supervision.
c) Literature on real authority
This paper is also related to the literature on real authority within organizations.
Using the terminology of Aghion and Tirole (1997), in this paper, the sponsor selects a
non-congruent SSO that will have real authority over the users.
Although quite diﬀerent in motivation and execution, our work is therefore related to
that of Dessein (2002). In his model, a principal delegates formal authority to a supervisor
with preferences that are intermediate between hers and the agent’s. This step motivates
the agent to exercise initiative, because he knows that the supervisor will listen to him.
It is also related to Caillaud and Tirole’s (1999) work on ideological bias. They show
that a party with partisan rank-and-ﬁle members is, in the eyes of uninformed voters, a
more credible certiﬁer for the strength of the (optimally) centrist platform of its leadership
than a party with a centrist rank-and-ﬁle. This relationship implies that partisan parties
may defeat centrist ones even in a Downsian world, where the median voter dictates
political choices.
2 An illustration4
One way to illustrate these issues is to consider standard-setting organizations. Our
interviews suggest two patterns that are consistent with the premises of the theoretical
4This section is based on interviews with SSO participants and corporate managers responsible for
standards.
4analysis below:
• that SSOs diﬀer in terms of the extent to which they are attuned to user’s desires,
and in the way sponsors have control over the standard;
• that certiﬁcation is a real concern of ﬁrms sponsoring new proposed standards.
The ﬁrst point can be illustrated by the fact that a ﬁrm seeking to get a technology
adopted as a new standard frequently faces a choice of three or four SSOs from which it
could seek certiﬁcation. In making a choice between existing SSOs, or between new and
existing organizations, the prestige of the body is an important consideration. While for
many ﬁrms, the ideal standard is a de facto one, which it or perhaps a special interest
group promulgates and everyone else adheres to, in many cases it cannot get a standard
established without being approved by a prestigious established SSO.
Relatedly, ﬁr m sb e l i e v et h a tS S O sd i ﬀer considerably in the extent to which a spon-
soring ﬁrm can inﬂuence the process. (The key variables include the composition of the
membership and the rules employed in reviewing proposed standards.) SSOs also diﬀer in
the extent of requirements regarding the disclosure and licensing of intellectual property.5
To illustrate these general points, consider two SSOs with similar mandates. (Even
more extreme diﬀerences would have been seen if we compared an SSO and a special
interest group.) The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is responsible for engineer-
ing and developing protocols for the Internet. It was formally established in 1986, but
predecessor organizations date back at least as far as the early 1970s. The International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) has been seeking to ensure the standardization of com-
munications since a 1865 agreement to facilitate the interconnection of national telegraph
systems. With a membership encompassing telecommunication policy-makers and regu-
lators, network operators, equipment manufacturers, hardware and software developers,
5Firms’ preferences diﬀer considerably across technologies. In some cases, they may very strongly feel
that it is important that they not commit to licensing their key patents; in other cases, they do not mind
making such commitments.
5and regional standards-making organizations, today it seeks to develop standards and
policies for all aspects of telecommunications.
These two groups diﬀer along a number of dimensions. One aspect is the nature of
the participants. At the IETF, individual members make decisions. At the ITU, national
governments are the key voting bodies; that is, the governments typically have formal or
informal bodies that seek to reconcile the divergent views of domestic ﬁrms and to form
a consensus, and in many cases the largest ﬁrms have dominated these advisory bodies.6
A second diﬀerence is the degree to which corporations can inﬂuence the process. This
reﬂects the way in which the two SSOs are organized, particularly the role that the area
directors play. At the ITU, the area director is primarily responsible for the managing the
standard-setting process. At the IETF, the area director has responsibility for both the
technical quality and process. This often leads to a more activist approach. As a result,
eﬀorts by corporations to shape the standard-setting agenda were often less successful.
This point can be illustrated by considering the process of initiating new projects at the
I T Ua n dI E T F .A tt h eI T U ,ap r o po s a lf o ran e wp r oj e c ti sb r o u g h tt oas t u d yg r o u p .A f t e r
reaching a consensus, the work begins while formal approval is solicited. The proposed
research agenda is circulated to the membership at large, an advisory group, and the body
of chairs of the various working groups. While all parties are free to suggest changes, the
study group is relatively free to accept or reject the proposed modiﬁcations. At the IETF,
however, the area (an equivalent of a study group) must begin with a written proposal to
their area director before initiating a project. The area director will discuss the proposal
with his peers, and then commence a formal evaluation procedure that entails holding one
or two meetings of prospective contributors. The area director will assess both the number
of attendees and the quality of the discussion at the meetings before giving permission
6It should be noted that while in its ﬁrst decades, engineers largely did participate in the IETF as
objective individual experts, regardless of their corporate aﬃliations, and the agendas of these ﬁrms and
decisions were largely driven by technological considerations, today this has changed somewhat. The
much greater stakes associated with the adoption of particular standards (particularly in light of the
bleak commercial environment for Internet and communications ﬁrms) implies that pressure is put on
engineers in some cases to conform to corporate priorities during the decision-making process.
6whether to proceed with the project or not. While there is an appeal process, the area
director’s decision typically is the last word. As a result of the diﬃculty that individual
ﬁrms frequently encounter in shaping the IETF agenda, it has been argued that the ITU
is a much more sympathetic venue for proposals by large telephone companies.
3 Forum shopping: basics
3.1 Model
We now present a simple model of sponsor’s choice among SSOs. In subsequent sections,
w ei n t r o d u c es o m er e ﬁnements.
Sponsors and users: Consider the sponsor (or group of sponsors) of a potential standard.
The standard, if adopted, will yield proﬁt π > 0 to the sponsor, and utility U for the
users of the standard. For the moment, we distinguish between sponsor and users; later
on, the sponsor will also have a downstream presence. Also, users should be understood
in a broad sense, and include in particular future innovators building on the technology.
Users adopt the standard only if they perceive U to be positive.
SSOs: The sponsor chooses an SSO. SSOs are characterized by their user-friendliness, or
more generally, by the ease with which a sponsor can get his standard approved by the
SSO. A SSO has objective function
U + απ.
For analytical convenience, we will assume in much of the paper that there is "free entry
in the SSO market": there is a continuum of SSOs indexed by α ∈ [0,∞). Free entry in
the SSO market is a strong assumption, but it allows us to use ﬁrst-order conditions to
capture our main points in a very simple manner.
The parameter α (which is common knowledge for each SSO) measures the conﬂict of
interest. It may be very large for a SIG, and very low for an SSO with a user orientation.
In general, α reﬂects, among other factors:
• the ease with which a yes vote can be obtained: simple majority rule, absence of a
7requirement of multiple interoperable implementations, and so forth,
• the composition of the board (users versus members of SIG),
• whether the users are direct or indirect users (downstream ﬁrms that compete with each
other may pass through some of their cost increases – or, in Section 4, an increase in the
royalty rate – to the ﬁnal consumer, and therefore their stake may be smaller than that
o fu s e r sa saw h o l e ) ,
• the SSO’s reputational concern vis-à-vis users.
Users’ utility: Users have utility
U = a + b,
where a is common knowledge and serves to calibrate the initial strength of the pro-
posed standard. This strength depends on common-knowledge technical merits and on
the existence of alternative technologies. In particular, a is smaller in the presence of an
alternative technology, since the users’ utility must be taken net of the opportunity cost
of adopting this particular technology.
The parameter b is unknown to both sponsor and users and reﬂects the unobserved
quality of the proposed standard for the users: How promising is the technology itself? Is
the technology likely to be blocked by (valid) patents? Or, if the technology is composed of
multiple pieces of intellectual property owned by several sponsors, how well do those pieces
interact with each other to beneﬁt the users? Allowing for some private information about
b held by the sponsor would complicate the analysis but not reverse our main conclusions,
as discussed below. Note also that SSOs all observe the same b.T h u s , t h e s p o n s o r , i f
she uses multiple SSOs, will not do so because she wants a second opinion after a ﬁrst
negative one.7
Let F (b) denote the cumulative distribution function. We assume that F has the
standard monotone hazard rate property: f /[1 − F] is increasing. This property in turn
7Morrison and White (2004) develop a model in which certiﬁers make mistakes and economic agents
looking for certiﬁcation may sequentially go down the list of certiﬁers. Meyer and Rothschild (2004)
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We consider the following three-stage game:
(1) The sponsor chooses an SSO, that is α.
(2) The SSO learns b (more generally, it could learn a signal of b), and then chooses
whether to recommend the standard.
(3) Users decide whether to adopt the standard.
We believe these assumptions about timing are plausible. SSOs do indeed frequently
involve end users, and consequently can get a sense of a proposed standard’s potential
value. Because many technologies are still in their early stages at the time that the
standard is endorsed, users frequently defer the decision whether to employ the standard
until after it has been endorsed. In this bare-bones version of the model, the SSO plays a
pure certiﬁcation role. In practice, besides this central function, SSOs play the auxiliary
roles of setting constraints on sponsors (e.g., disclosure and licensing requirements) and
of inducing a convergence of rival sponsors on a unique standard. Such roles, which are
discussed in the next sections, are less fundamental in that the sponsor(s), unlike for the
certiﬁcation function, can achieve the outcomes by themselves.
3.2 Equilibrium forum shopping
At stage (2), the SSO approves the standard when facing signal b if and only if 8
[a + b]+απ ≥ 0.
8We ignore the "babbling equilibria" in which the users never adopt the standard and the SSO approves
randomly (this equilibrium exists if a + E [b] < 0) or else the SSO always recommends and users adopt
regardless of the recommendation (this equilibrium exists if a + E [b] > 0). Given this, the continuation
equilibrium outcome for a given α is unique.
9Ah i g h e rα means a more likely approval.
Users adopt the standard when approved by the SSO if and only if9
E [a + b|a + b + απ ≥ 0]≥ 0,
or
a + E [b|b ≥−(a + απ)]≥ 0. (1)
The left-hand side of inequality (1) decreases with α and increases with a.
The sponsor chooses the highest possible α subject to the credibility constraint (1).
Hence:
• If a + E [b] ≥ 0,t h e nα∗ = ∞ : the technology will be adopted as a de facto standard
anyway, and so there is no point risking being turned down by a standard setting organi-
zation.
• If a + E [b] < 0 (the interesting case), then







∗ ≡−(a + α
∗π). (2)
Because the conditional mean m(·) has slope between 0 and 1, equation (2) deﬁnes a
single and increasing solution α∗ (a).
Note also that the sponsor has no incentive to apply to a more sympathetic SSO
(α > α∗) when turned down, as the standard will then not be adopted anyway:
a + E [b|−(a + α
∗π) >b≥−(a + απ)]< 0.
9In order to avoid “openness problems,” we will assume that users adopt with probability one if (1)
is satisﬁed with equality (this is indeed the only equilibrium possibility).
10Proposition 1 The weaker the proposed standard, the more credible the SSO selected by
the sponsor: α∗ increases with a. The sponsor’s expected payoﬀ is then
[1 − F (−a − α
∗ (a)π)]π.
In the conversations we had with ﬁrms active in the standard-setting process, this
proposition was repeatedly corroborated. Our interviewees emphasized that they only
selected as strong a SSO as was needed to gain widespread acceptance of the standard.
We may compare the allocation resulting from the sponsor’s choice of SSO and that
that would obtain under a social planner putting an exogenous relative weight w on the
sponsor’s interests relative to the users’. Such a social planner would want adoption
whenever b ≥ b b,w h e r e
a +b b + wπ =0
For attractive standards (α∗ (a) >w ), the sponsor chooses an SSO that is too friendly
from a social viewpoint, and so the social planner would like to impose a less complacent
SSO.
For less attractive standards (α∗ (a) <w ), by contrast, the social planner ﬁnds users
to be too reluctant to adopt the technology (as they do not internalize the sponsor’s
beneﬁt). Yet there is nothing that the social planner can do. An SSO that was more
friendly than α∗ (a) would be unable to get users on board by endorsing the standard.
Proposition 2 From the point of view of a social planner putting relative weight w on
the sponsor’s interests relative to the users’, the sponsor’s choice of SSO is
• too complacent if the technology is very attractive (α∗ (a) >w ),
• constrained optimal if the technology is less attractive (α∗ (a) · w).
3.3 Can the sponsor do better?
One may wonder whether the strategy described in Section 3.2 is overall optimal for the
sponsor. We have indeed assumed that the sponsor applies to a single SSO; the sponsor
11could apply to multiple SSOs either simultaneously or sequentially. Also, the SSO issues
a 0/1 recommendation; the SSO could convey more information (for example, announce
b). It turns out that, in our model, the sponsor cannot deviate from the simple strategy
analyzed thus far and obtain a higher payoﬀ:
Proposition 3 The sponsor cannot achieve an expected payoﬀ higher than the one (de-
ﬁned in Proposition 1) that she obtains by applying to a single SSO with characteristic
α∗ (a) and issuing a yes/no recommendation.
Proof : For any extensive form of the standardization game10 and for any b,l e tX(b) ∈ [0,1]
denote the present discounted probability of adoption by the users when the state of nature
is b.11





E [X(b)(a + b)] ≥ 0
and
0 · X(b) · 1 for all b.
The ﬁrst constraint comes from the users’ individual rationality: Were they to expect
a negative utility, then they might as well never adopt. Letting β denote the shadow price
of this constraint, the ﬁrst-order condition is:
X(b)= 1if π + β (a + b) > 0
=0 if π + β (a + b) < 0.
10For example, the sponsor could apply to an arbitrary number n0 of SSOs of her choice at date 0, who
would then issue recommendations, resulting in either user adoption, or in non-adoption, in which case
at date 1 the sponsor could apply to an arbitrary number n1 of SSOs, and so forth.
11For example, if δ is the discount factor and xt (b) denotes the equilibrium unconditional probability
that the standard is adopted by the users when b obtains (0 · Σ∞









Our interviewees indeed expressed skepticism about approaching a number of SSOs
simultaneously. It is unclear that a second SSO’s endorsement necessarily leads to enough
additional certiﬁcation to make it worth the trouble.12
Obviously, we do not want to imply that sponsors will always apply to a single SSO.
Indeed, the sponsor in this model might want to apply to multiple SSOs if the latter
observed only noisy measures of users’ utility. Furthermore, Section 5.2 and Section
6 will demonstrate that applying to multiple SSOs may beneﬁt a sponsor when either
users are heterogeneous or there is competition from another technology.13 Proposition 3,
however, identiﬁes a robust factor encouraging sponsors to focus on a single SSO: There
is no point being more ambitious than needed for adoption, as the stigma from rejection
by a tough SSO undoes the beneﬁcial impact of endorsement by a more friendly one.
3.4 Sponsor has private information about user beneﬁt
We have assumed that the sponsor has no information on the SSO’s future assessment b
of user beneﬁt. Suppose by way of contrast that the sponsor receives a signal σ about b
with joint distribution H (σ,b) and conditional distribution G(b|σ).
Proposition 4 When the sponsor receives a private signal σ regarding the SSO’s assess-
ment variable b:
(i) it is still an equilibrium for the sponsor to choose SSO with preference α∗ (a),r e g a r d -
less of her information σ about the SSO’s later assessment of the standard’s user beneﬁt;
12Another reason raised by interviewees is related to the concessions that are made by the sponsors:
They asserted that it is almost inevitable that multiple standards will emerge: each group is likely to
have its own approach, which will lead to them making diﬀerent choices.
13A third reason why a sponsor may apply to multiple SSOs is that the latter may make mistakes: see
Morrison-White (2004).
13(ii) more generally, the equilibrium choice of SSO does not reveal anything about the
sponsor’s information.
Proof :F o rag i v e nα, it is still the case that the SSO endorses the standard if and
only if
a + b + απ ≥ 0,
deﬁning a threshold b b(α).L e tFα (b) denote the users’ updated beliefs about b given that
the sponsor chooses SSO α (users update their beliefs about σ and thereby about b). Let
mα (b) ≡ Eα
³
e b
¯ ¯ ¯e b ≥ b
´
denote the corresponding conditional mean. Consider then the
set of αs that lead to adoption:
n
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The sponsor, regardless of her information σ, is better oﬀ choosing the highest α in this
set so as to maximize the probability of endorsement. The highest point in the set may
be equal to or strictly smaller than α∗ (a), but there must be full pooling in equilibrium.
The equilibrium in which all types σ select SSO α∗ (a) is Pareto optimal from the point
of view of the sponsor’s types. ¥
Remark: This absence of signaling through the choice of SSO does not carry over to the
case where the sponsor is present in the downstream market (see Section 5.1).
3.5 Scaleability
Top scientiﬁc articles are often submitted to top-rank journals. One reason for this is that
these journals have a wider circulation. But the main reason is the authors’ beneﬁtf r o m
14publication (π)i si n c r e a s i n gi st h eq u a l i t y( s) of the journal (indeed, in the Internet era,
the circulation argument has become less important and the certiﬁcation is tantamount).14
A simple variation of our model provides a good account of this behavior: Suppose
that a journal of quality s decides to publish the paper if and only if:
[a − σ(s)] + b ≥ 0,
where a is the paper’s observable qual i t y( k n o w nb yt h ea u t h o r ) ,σ(s) the journal’s "stan-
dard" (σ0(s) > 0) and b the (referees’ and editors’) personal assessment variable. We leave
aside for the moment any preference for the topic or author (the α term). The author’s
objective function is:
[1 − F (σ(s) − a)]π(s).
The cross-partial derivative of the logarithm of this utility function wih respect to a and
s is positive, and so, by revealed preference, a higher-quality paper (a) is submitted to a
better journal (s). [This result generalizes to the introduction of a journal preference for
topics or authors as long as it is not too strong (i.e., σ0(s) − απ0(s) > 0). Solving for the
equilibrium behavior in presence of such preferences is an interesting topic for research.]
4 Standard design
Section 3 assumed that the characteristics of the potential standard are ﬁxed. In practice,
the sponsors can choose, and the SSO can try to alter, various characteristics of the
proposed standard. These may include which features are included, whether patents or
applications are disclosed, the terms of licensing (whether or not the sponsor must commit
to license its patents on a reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) or a royalty-free
basis), the exclusion of patented material requiring a more elaborate implementation,
14More generally, our basic model understates the importance of scaleability. Scaleability plays an
important role in Morrison-White (2004), in which an endorsement by a more able regulator allows a
bank to attract a higher volume of deposits.
15and so forth. The design question arises in other applications of the theory as well; for
example, authors can oﬀer, or editors of the journal demand, a shorter paper, a diﬀerent
emphasis, less ambitious claims, or broader citations.
4.1 Strategic design by the sponsor
To reﬂect this discussion, let us introduce an endogenous parameter c of "concessions" to
the users.15 The users’ utility is now.
U = a + b + c.
Ah i g h e rc may stand for a modiﬁcation of the standard favorable to the users or for a
commitment to a lower licensing price. Concessions are costly to the sponsor: the proﬁt
is now π(c),w i t hπ
0 < 0 and π
00 · 0. We assume for the moment that the sponsor selects
both α and c.
Following the lines of the previous analysis, the standard is adopted by the users
following an endorsement by the SSO if and only if:
a + c + E [b|b ≥−(a + c + απ(c))] ≥ 0. (3)
The sponsor then solves
max
{α,c}
[1 − F (−(a + c + απ(c)))]π(c)
subject to (3). Condition (3), satisﬁed with equality, deﬁnes α for a given choice of c:
b
∗ ≡−[a + c + απ(c)] = m
−1 (−(a + c)).
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15For simplicity, we assume that the sponsor chooses c. Sponsors actually sometimes employ a sequen-
tial strategy. In these cases, they recruit a close-in set of peers into a special interest group, where the
real technological choices (and therefore the choice of c) are made, and then approach a larger SSO to
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−1 (−(a + c)).
Furthermore, equation (4), together with the identities a + c + m(b∗)=0and a + b∗ +
c + απ =0 , yields:
1+απ
0 (c)=0 . (5)
Proposition 5 (i) The equilibrium concession is given by
1
m(b∗) − b∗ =
−π0 (c)
π(c)
,w h e r eb
∗ = m
−1 (−(a + c)).
( i i )T h ew e a k e rt h ep r o p o s e ds t a n d a r d ,t h em o r ee x t e n s i v et h ec o n c e s s i o n sa n dt h em o r e
credible the SSO selected by the sponsor: c∗ decreases with a and α∗ increases with a.
Proof : Part (i) has already been demonstrated. Part (ii) is obtained by diﬀerentiating
(4). ¥
We can further extend Proposition 3. One might think that state-contingent conces-
sions may be desirable. This is, however, not the case:
Proposition 6 The sponsor cannot achieve an expected payoﬀ higher than the one (de-
ﬁned in Proposition 5) that she obtains by ﬁxing c, and applying to a single SSO issuing
a yes/no recommendation.
17Proof : The proof follows closely that of Proposition 3. Let xt (b) denote the present
discounted probability of adoption at t,a n dct (b) denote the state-contingent concession,
with π(ct (b)) denoting the corresponding proﬁt.16




0 xt (b)π(ct (b))]
s.t.
E [Σ∞
0 xt (b)[a + b + ct (b)]] ≥ 0
and
0 · Σ∞
0 xt (b) · 1 for all b.
Letting β denote the shadow price of the ﬁrst constraint, one obtains a constant concession
c:
π
0 (c)+β =0 ;
and
x0 (b)=1 if π (c)+β (a + b + c) ≥ 0 ; xt (b)=0 otherwise.
This policy is again implemented by an SSO with type α =1 /β. ¥
Before applying Proposition 5 to licensing fees, we may ask two further questions
related to the timing of concessions:
• We have assumed that the sponsor deﬁnes the standard’s speciﬁcation (c)a n dt h e n
submits it to the SSO. This is a simpliﬁcation. Certainly in many cases, the determination
of the level of concessions is in the hands of the SSO or is determined through a negotiation
of the two parties. Is the ﬁnal outcome diﬀerent if the sponsor applies to a SSO, which
then picks the standard’s speciﬁcation and decides whether to approve it? That is, is
there a cost for the sponsor of deferring to the SSO?
• Another issue arises if the speciﬁcation c cannot be set at the standard setting date and
will be at the discretion of the sponsor after the SSO has made a recommendation but
16In principle, ct (b) could be a random variable. Because of the concavity of π, though, we are
characterizing the upper bound on the sponsor’s proﬁt.
18before the users have adopted the standard. That is, is there a cost for the sponsor of not
b e i n ga b l et oc o m m i tt oas p e c i ﬁcation?
The answer to these two questions turns out to be negative under free entry into the
SSO market:
• Deferrence to the SSO.
Suppose that the sponsor does not select c, and leaves it to the discretion of the SSO.
If the latter has type α, it chooses the extent of the concessions c,g i v e nb y
c
∗ (α)=a r gm a x{c + απ(c)}.
c∗ (α) is a decreasing function of α.
The sponsor cannot do better by deferring t ot h eS S Os i n c es h ec a na l w a y sd u p l i c a t e
the SSO’s choice of speciﬁcations. But she might perhaps do better by not deferring since
she has two degrees of freedom (α and c) instead of one (α) .F o re x a m p l e ,i tm i g h t ,i n
order to persuade users, have to choose a tough SSO, which would then impose substantial
concessions. That this is actually not a concern results from equation (5), which shows
that the optimal concession can be delegated to the SSO.
Proposition 7 Under free entry for SSOs, the sponsor can costlessly defer the choice of
speciﬁcation c to the selected SSO.
• Non-commitment.
Suppose now that the sponsor cannot commit in advance on the terms that will be
oﬀered to users. We thus assume that the sponsor sets c after the SSO has rendered
an opinion, but before the users choose whether to adopt the sponsor’s technology (for
example, c may relate to the choice of licensing fee, as explored below). The SSO must then
take a forward-looking perspective and anticipate the speciﬁcation that will be selected
by the sponsor.
19Thus, if the equilibrium threshold for the SSO is b∗, and assuming that the SSO has





The SSO (with type α), anticipating the choice of c∗, therefore ought to endorse the
technology if and only if













This equation is, however, the same, for a given α, as the one obtained by combining (4)
and (5).
Proposition 8 The outcome is unchanged if the sponsor is unable to commit to the
speciﬁcation c.
• Application to licensing fees.
Sponsors sometimes beneﬁt directly (through licensing fees) and not only indirectly
(through related activities) from standards. For example, Qualcomm’s earnings from tech-
nology licensing, which largely derived from transactions involving its patents critical to
the CDMA standard, were $325 million in the ﬁrst quarter of ﬁscal year 2004 and ac-
counted for more than half of the ﬁrm’s earnings.17 Suppose that the sponsor can commit
to a licensing fee.18 When the sponsor charges licensing fee p ≥ 0 to users,19 then c = −p.
The users’ utility is
a + b − p
17http: // www.qualcomm.com/press/PDF/QCOM_Q104.pdf (accessed March 28, 2004).
18In practice, the commitment made by licensors regarding royalties in standard setting processes is
usually vaguer (e.g., RAND). But the sponsor(s) can commit in other ways, for example through a patent
pool that sets and commits to a level of royalties.
19We assume that negative licensing fees (p<0)c a n n o tb eo ﬀered as they induce non-serious licensees
to accept the cash payment without using the technology.
20and the sponsor’s utility in case of adoption is
π = π0 + p.
And so, π
0 = −1. Applying equation (5) yields:
Proposition 9 If α > 1 in the absence of licensing fee, then the optimal licensing fee is
positive (p>0), and the sponsor chooses a balanced SSO: α =1 , yielding socially eﬃcient
recommendations (a + b∗ + π =0 ) .I fα < 1 in the absence of licensing fee, then there is
no licensing fee chosen (p =0 )e v e nw h e ns u c hf e e sa r ef e a s i b l e .
• Social optimality
As in Section 3, we can investigate the assessment, by a social planner putting relative
weight w on the sponsor’s interests, of the speciﬁcation chosen by the sponsor.
Let us consider the following timing:
(1) The SSO (i.e., α) is chosen by the sponsor (no regulation of SSO choice) or by the
social planner (regulation of SSO choice).
(2) The sponsor (in the absence of mandated levels of concessions) or the social planner
(under regulation) chooses concession level c. The SSO learns b and chooses whether to
recommend the standard.
(3) Users decide whether to adopt the standard.
Proposition 10 Consider a social planner putting relative weight w on the sponsor’s
interests relative to the users’.
(i) There exists a threshold a0 such that when the standard is less attractive than a0
(a · a0), then laissez-faire is optimal.
(ii) For a>a 0, regulation of both SSO choice and speciﬁcation raises social welfare.
However, regulation of a single dimension (SSO choice or speciﬁcation) lowers welfare.
21Proof: Let (α∗ (a),c ∗ (a)) denote the unregulated outcome . The social planner by con-
trast would like to choose c = b c with
1+wπ
0 (b c)=0 ,
and would like the standard to be adopted whenever
a + b +b c + wπ(b c) ≥ 0.
Let a0 be such that α∗ (a0)=w. For attractiveness a0, the social planner does not need
to regulate either choice by the sponsor. When a<a 0, the social planner cannot improve
on the sponsor’s choices.20
So, let us assume that a>a 0, or equivalently, that α∗ (a) >w . If the social planner
regulates the choice of SSO only, at some level α < α∗ (a), then the sponsor lowers c so
as to keep users indiﬀerent between adopting or not:
a + m(−(a + c + απ(c))) + c =0 .
The sponsor is worse oﬀ than under laissez-faire and the users no better oﬀ. Similarly, a
regulation of c above c∗ (a) leads to an increase in α that keeps users indiﬀerent, and to
a reduction in social welfare. ¥
20Using a mechanism design approach, the social planner’s optimal scheme solves:
max
{X(·),c}
E [X (b)[a + b + c + wπ (c)]]
s.t.
E [X (b)(a + b + c)] ≥ 0.
Letting µ denote the shadow price of the constraint, it is easy to see that µ>0 if and only if a<a 0.I n
this case,
(1 + µ)+wπ0 (c)=0
and the standard is adopted if and only if
(1 + µ)(a + b + c)+wπ (c) ≥ 0.





E [X (b)(a + b + c)] ≥ 0.
224.2 Technology morphing by the SSO
Proposition 7 stated an intriguing result: Under free entry into the SSO market, i.e., when
the sponsor can choose any desired degree of congruence α, there is no dissonance between
the selected SSO and the sponsor concerning the standard’s speciﬁcation. Unlike most
other results, this particular result hinges on the free entry assumption. By contrast, an
SSO with market power can demand concessions beyond what the sponsor would naturally
grant.
Suppose that the only operational SSO has type α smaller than what the sponsor
would wish (see below), and that the sponsor must rely on this SSO’s certiﬁcation in
order to get the standard adopted.
Simplify the model by assuming two possible values of c : cL or cH,w i t hcL <c H with
π(cL) > π(cH) > 0. Suppose that, in a non-bargaining situation (the sponsor chooses
c), the sponsor obtains adoption following the SSO’s endorsement for either speciﬁcation
but prefers low concessions (cL). Formally, let b b(ck), k ∈ {L,H},w i t hb b(cH) <b b(cL),b e
deﬁned by
a +b b(ck)+ck + απ(ck)=0 .





+ ck ≥ 0 for k ∈ {L,H}.















(If this condition is not satisﬁed, it can be shown that the sponsor is best oﬀ making the
high concession at the start of the bargaining game below.) The SSO’s preference for high
concessions can be expressed as:
cH + απ(cH) >c L + απ(cL).
23Let us now consider the two-period version of this model, with discount factor δ.I n
each period t =1 ,2 (but only in period 2 if the standard has not been adopted in period
1, as an adoption decision is irreversible):
• ﬁrst, the sponsor sets the level of concession ct;
• second, the SSO decides whether to recommend the associated standard;
• third, the users decide whether to adopt the standard.
We focus on pure-strategy equilibria of this game.
This bargaining game between sponsor and SSO is reminiscent of the wars of attrition
beteween two competing sponsors studied in Farrell (1996) and Simcoe (2003). A novel
ingredient is the presence of a third player, the users, who watch the bargaining game
and ultimately determine whether the technology is adopted.
Let b b>b b(cL) be such that for b = b b, the SSO is indiﬀerent between endorsing a
low-concession standard at date 1 and waiting for a larger concession:
(1 + δ)
h




a +b b + cH + απ(cH)
i
.
And let µ(b1 , b2) denote the mean of b conditional on b belonging to the interval [b1 , b2].
Suppose that the sponsor chooses c = cL at date 1. There can be three types of
continuation equilibria:
(1) In the ﬁrst case, the sponsor will not be able to get the standard adopted (even by
choosing c = cH)a td a t e2 .I nt h i sc a s e ,t h ed a t e - 1c u t - o ﬀ isb b(cL). The sponsor then gets






+ cH · 0. (6)
(The sponsor does not get a second chance, and therefore is able to commit not to make
a further concession.)
As α grows, both b b(cH) and b b(cL) decrease and so (6) is more likely to be satisﬁed.
24For α =0 , a +b b(cH)+cH =0and so (6) is not satisﬁed. For α ≥ b α,w h e r e
cL + b απ(cL)=cH + b απ(cH),
the SSO does not endorse the standard in period 2 if it has not endorsed it in period 1.
Hence there exists α1, 0 < α1 < b α, such that the intransigent equilibrium exists if and
only if α ≥ α1.
(2) In the second case, the standard will be adopted with some probability at date 2 (which





+ cH ≥ 0. (7)


















o t h e r w i s et h eu s e r sw o u l db e n e ﬁt from waiting until date 2 for a larger concession even
after the SSO endorses the standard at date 1.
As for the intransigent equilibrium, let us investigate the impact of α on the existence
of the technology morphing equilibrium. First, note that b b(cH) and b b both decrease with





−b b ≥ α[(1 + δ)π(cL) − δπ(cH)],( 9 )
with db b/dα = −[(1 + δ)π(cL) − δπ(cH)], and so (9) is also less likely to be satisﬁed
as α grows. Furthermore, both (7) and (9) are satisﬁed for α =0 .F o r α = b α,t h e
technology morphing equilibrium cannot exist since the SSO can reach its maximum
payoﬀ by endorsing the standard at t =1whenever b ≥ b b(cL).S o t h e r e e x i s t s α2,
0 < α2 < b α, such that the technology morphing equilibrium exists if and only if α · α2.
We then obtain a technology morphing equilibrium in which the SSO with positive
probability obtains further concessions (with delay) from the sponsor.

















(3) Last, let us investigate the third form of equilibrium, in which the users do not adopt
the standard at date 1 regardless of the recommendation. The sponsor must then set
cH at date 2 (if no further concession were expected, the standard might as well be
a d o p t e da td a t e1 ) . W eu s eas l i g h tr e ﬁnement of perfect equilibrium, trembling hand
perfect equilibrium, in order to identify the SSO’s date-1 behavior. For an arbitrary small
probability that the standard is adopted at date 1 in case of endorsement by the SSO,
then the SSO endorses the standard if and only if b ≥ b b. Hence this "late adoption
equilibrium" exists if and only if (7) is satisﬁed and (8) violated. For such parameter
conﬁgurations, the sponsor is better oﬀ making concession cH at date 1 already.
To sum up, the intransigent equilibrium exists if (6) is satisﬁed, the technology mor-
phing equilibrium exists if (7) and (8) are satisﬁed, and the late adoption continuation
equilibrium exists if (7) is satisﬁed and (8) violated. If (8) is satisﬁed, and given that (7)
is satisﬁed at α = α1, multiple equilibria co-exist: If the SSO expects the users to adopt
the high-concession standard at date 2, then the SSO is less prone to endorse the low-
concession standard at date 1, and so the signal conveyed by a lack of date-1 endorsement
is not as bad, making users willing to adopt the standard at date 2.
Interestingly, the intransigent equilibrium is less likely to exist, and the technology
morphing equilibrium more likely to exist, when the technology becomes more attractive
(a grows). An attractive technology makes it more likely that future concessions trigger
adoption despite the users’ reluctance to adopt given the lack of endorsement at date
1. This in turn undermines the credibility of the sponsor sticking to a user-unfriendly
speciﬁcation.
We can also illustrate equilibrium behavior as a function of α. For this, assume that
discounting is suﬃcient, so that (8) holds (this rules out the late-adoption continuation
equilibrium, but the latter is uninteresting to the extent that the sponsor is better oﬀ
26making the concession at date 1 already). Using (6) and (7), which do not depend on the
discount factor, then the behavior following a low concession cL at date 1 is depicted as
in ﬁgure 1. It can further be shown that either of the two behaviors depicted in ﬁgure 1
can be observed once the sponsor’s choice of date 1 concession is endogenized.21
Figure 1
Proposition 11 When the SSO is more user-oriented than the sponsor would wish, the
SSO engages with the sponsor in a two-way bargaining game over standard design, with
a third party, the users, observing the game and ultimately determining adoption. In
an intransigent equilibrium, the sponsor can credibly commit to a low-concession level,
thanks to the "rejection curse," which discourages users from later accepting even a
higher concession when the SSO fails to endorse the initial design. By contrast, in a
technology-morphing equilibrium, the SSO may force concessions on the sponsor. There ex-
ists (α1 , α2) in (0 , b α) such that the intransigent equilibrium exists if and only if α ≥ α1,
and the technology morphing equilibrium exists if and only if α · α2. The two equilibria
co-exist over a range of parameters.
5E x t e n s i o n s
This section investigates a number of relevant extensions.













π(cH), when choosing cH.S o ,f o rα equal or close
to b α, users adopt technology cL or never adopt.
Next, assume that α =0 . For small δ,t h e nb b is close to b b(cL) and so the proﬁt in the technology
morphing equilibrium exceeds that associated with the choice of cH at date 1.
275.1 Downstream presence of the sponsor
Assume now that the sponsor is herself a user and in fact represents a fraction θ ∈ [0,1] of
the user community. In a ﬁrst step, let us rule out royalties and assume that the sponsor’s
payoﬀ in case of adoption is
π + θ(a + b),
while the independent users’ payoﬀ is
(1 − θ)(a + b).
For simplicity, we assume that these payoﬀs are conditional on all users adopting (strong
network externalities). The upstream proﬁt π represents the spillover of the downstream
adoption on a complementary activity of the sponsor.
As earlier, let X (b) ∈ [0,1] denote the probability of adoption by the user community.
An upper bound on the sponsor’s proﬁti s
max
{X(·)}
E [X (b)[π + θ(a + b)]]
s.t.
E [X (b)[a + b]] ≥ 0.
This is equivalent to selecting a threshold above which the users adopt the technology. As
earlier, let b∗ be deﬁned by:
a + m(b
∗)=0 .













Ignoring the users’ participation constraint, taking the log-derivative and using the ex-
pression for m
0 s h o w st h a tt h i sp r o ﬁt is maximized for cut-oﬀ b∗∗ given by:
π + θ(a + b
∗∗)=0 ,
28as one would expect.
Reintroducing the users’ participation constraint, we are led to consider two cases:
Weak downstream presence: π + θ[a + m−1 (−a)] > 0. Recalling that a + m−1 (−a) < 0,
this condition is satisﬁed for θ below some strictly positive threshold. When the sponsor
has a weak downstream presence, then b∗∗ <b ∗, and so the sponsor’s preferred policy is
too lax to enlist the independent users. Thus, the "constrained optimal" policy is given
by threshold b∗.
This policy can be implementing by selecting an SSO putting relative weight α on the
sponsor relative to independent users, where
(1 − θ)(a + b








1 − θ + θα
.
γ < 1/θ as long as θ < 1.U s i n gt h eﬁrst equality, it can be checked that α grows from
γ > 1 to ∞ as θ g r o w si nt h i sr e g i o ni fα > 1 in the absence of downstream presence
(θ =0 )and decreases as θ grows if α < 1 in the absence of downstream presence.
Strong downstream presence: π +θ[a + m−1 (−a)] < 0. This region exists only if π is not
too large (i.e., π < −a−m−1 (−a)). Put another way, it exists if and only if α > 1 in the
absence of downstream presence (θ =0 ) . In this region, b∗∗ >b ∗, and so the independent
users’ participation constraint is not binding. The sponsor is suﬃciently preoccupied
with downstream performance that independent users obtain a rent. This does not mean,
though, that the sponsor and the independent users are fully congruent; indeed, the
sponsor selects an SSO that issues recommendations that are still too favorable to the
sponsor’s interests: Namely, the selected SSO recommends adoption whenever b ≥ b∗∗
where a+b∗∗ < 0. The selected SSO is entirely devoted to the sponsor’s interests (α = ∞).
29In a sense, the SSO is basically a sponsor-controlled laboratory that advises the sponsor
(and indirectly the independent users) as to the adequacy of the technology.
We summarize these results in:
Proposition 12 Suppose that the sponsor represents a fraction θ ∈ [0,1] of the down-
stream industry and that there are strong network externalities.
• If π+[a + m−1 (−a)] < 0, that is if α > 1 in the absence of downstream presence, there
exists θ
∗ < 1 such that:
(i) for weak downstream presence ( θ · θ
∗), the independent users’ participation con-
straint is binding. The selected SSO recommends adoption if and only if b ≥ b∗,a n d
puts more and more weight on the sponsor’s interests as the latter’s downstream presence
increases.
(ii) for strong downstream presence ( θ > θ
∗), independent users enjoy a rent. The se-
lected SSO is entirely devoted to the sponsor’s interests.
• If π +[ a + m−1 (−a)] > 0, i.e., if α is smaller than 1 in the absence of downstream
presence, then the independent users’ participation constraint is always binding, and the
s e l e c t e dS S Op u t sl e s sa n dl e s sw e i g h to nt h es p o n s o r ’ si n t e r e s t sa st h el a t t e r ’ sd o w n s t r e a m
presence increases.
For completeness, let us describe the outcome when, as in Section 4, the sponsor
derives income from royalties: π = π0 + p,w h e r eπ0 is the non-royalty-based spillover


















. It is easy to check that, as in Proposition 9, the sponsor wants to
generate cut-oﬀ rule a +b b + π0 =0 .
Proposition 4 showed that in the absence of downstream presence, allowing the sponsor
to receive a private signal about user beneﬁt has no impact on equilibrium. This is no
30longer the case under downstream presence, at least if θ is suﬃciently large.22 Intuitively,
when conﬁdent that user beneﬁts are high, it is relatively costless for the sponsor to turn
to an SSO that is inclined to accept standards that are weak, even from the sponsor’s
viewpoint.
To demonstrate this, let us assume that the sponsor’s signal makes her optimistic or
pessimistic about user beneﬁts: With probability ρ (respectively, 1 − ρ), the density of
her distribution conditional on the signal is fH(b) (respectively fL(b)). We assume the




is strictly increasing in b.
MLRP implies that under symmetric information (users too receive the sponsor’s signal),








i is deﬁned by a+mi (b∗
i)=0 ,a n dmi is relative to the distribution fi , i = H,L).
Under asymmetric information, we look for a separating equilibrium, assuming that the
pessimistic type has weak downstream presence (b∗
L >b ∗∗).23 In a separating equilibrium,
the choice of SSO reveals the sponsor’s type. It is therefore optimal for the pessimistic
type to choose the same SSO that she would choose under symmetric information. And
so the cutoﬀ is b∗
L.
Let bH denote the cut-oﬀ o ft h eS S Oc h o s e nb yt h eo p t i m i s t i ct y p e .T h ef o l l o w i n g




[π + θ(a + b)]fL(b)db ≥
Z ∞
bH
[π + θ(a + b)]fL(b)db.( 1 0 )





L (y) for all y, this condition says nothing about whether the optimistic type
has a strong or weak downstream presence.
31Because [π + θ(a + b)] is positive above b∗∗, incentive compatibility requires that:
bH <b
∗∗.
This condition in turn requires that the optimistic type have a strong downstream presence
(b∗
H <b ∗∗); otherwise, independent users would not adopt the standard even when they









In the "least cost separation equilibrium" (i.e., the separating equilibrium that is
Pareto-dominant in the class of separating equilibria), (10) is satisﬁed with equality.24
For this separating equilibrium to exist, a necessary and suﬃcient condition is then that
the independent users adopt the standard when they learn that the sponsor is optimistic:
bH ≥ b
∗
H.( 1 1 )
It can be checked that (10) and (11) are not inconsistent.
Proposition 13 Assume that under symmetric information the optimistic type has a
strong downstream presence and the pessimistic type a weak downstream presence (b∗
H <
b∗∗ <b ∗
L). Let bH <b ∗∗be deﬁned by (10) satisﬁed with equality. Then if bH ≥ b∗
H,t h e r e
exists a separating equilibrium. The sponsor signals that she has good news about users’
beneﬁt by choosing a sponsor who puts even more weight on proﬁtability than she herself
does; she thereby demonstrates that low user beneﬁts are unlikely.












The separating equilibrium is for example sustained by the belief that the sponsor is pessimistic whenever
she selects an SSO with cutoﬀ exceeding bH.
32As is usual, the separating equilibrium may be dominated (even for the optimistic
type) by a pooling (or semi-separating) equilibrium, which exists if the prior probability ρ
that the sponsor is optimistic is large enough. For example, for large enough ρ, threshold
b∗∗ can be obtained in a pooling equilibrium.
5.2 User heterogeneity
Until now we have assumed that any given user group is homogeneous and therefore has
all its members adopt or not adopt. Let us now treat the case of within-user-group het-
erogeneity and allow for network externalities as well. We ﬁrst analyze user heterogeneity
in the absence of network externalities among users (case a), then under "strong network
externalities," i.e., when all users must adopt for the standard to be successful (case b),
and ﬁnally the general case (case c). Note that user homogeneity made the issue of net-
work externalities moot, since all users either adopted or did not adopt.
a) No network externalities.
Assume that there are two types of users.25 Type H, "eager users", have utility
UH (b)=aH +b, and are in proportion ρ.T y p eL, "skeptical users," have utility UL (b)=
aL + b,w h e r eaL <a H, and are in proportion 1 − ρ.26 Users know their type, but the
sponsor cannot tell them apart. The sponsor receives πH when the eager types adopt and
πL when the skeptical types adopt (where the proportions ρ and 1 − ρ are factored into
the deﬁnitions of πH and πL). Adoption by both types yields π = πH + πL.
Let us take a mechanism design approach in order to determine an upper bound on the
sponsor’s proﬁt and then show how this upper bound can be obtained through adequate
forum shopping. Let Xi (b) ∈ [0,1] denote the probability that type i, i ∈ {L,H}, adopts
25We are grateful to Emmanuel Fahri for Proposition 14 and its proof.
26We assume that aH +E(b) < 0, and so no category of users is willing to adopt the standard without
certiﬁcation.
33when user beneﬁti sai + b. The sponsor’s maximal proﬁti sg i v e nb y
max{XL(·),XH(·)} {E [XL (b)πL + XH (b)πH]}
s.t.
E [XL (b)(aL + b)] ≥ 0,
and
E [XH (b)(aH + b)] ≥ E [XL (b)(aH + b)].
The ﬁrst constraint is the skeptical users’ participation constraint (were they to expect a
negative payoﬀ, they could improve their welfare by never participating), and the second
the eager users’ incentive constraint (they can always masquerade as skeptical users). A
straightforward analysis of this linear program demonstrates the existence of thresholds
bL and bH:
XL (b)=1 iﬀ b ≥ bL
and
XH (b)=1 iﬀ b ≥ bH;
furthermore, the two constraints are binding. And so,
bL = b
∗





The incentive constraint is:












⇐⇒ aH + µ(bH , b
∗
L)=0 ,( 1 3 )
where as earlier, µ(x,y) denote the expectation of b conditional on b belonging to the
interval [x,y].




Conversely, if aH +b∗
L ≥ 0,t h e nt h e r ee x i s t sabH satisfying (13) (as long as the standard
cannot be adopted as a de facto standard, aH + µ(−∞ , b∗
L) < 0).
When aH + b∗
L < 0, the incentive compatibility condition (13) requires that bH >b ∗
L,
which is infeasible as long as all users receive the same information: Because eager users
by deﬁnition are more eager to adopt than skeptical ones, XH (b) ≥ XL (b) for all b,a n d
so bH · b∗
L after all. The constrained optimum is then bH = b∗
L as long as πL/πH is not
too small (if 1 − ρ and therefore πL/πH are small, it becomes optimal for the sponsor to
ignore the skeptical users and to choose bH = b∗
H,w i t haH + m(b∗
H)=0 ).
Let us now turn to the implementation of the optimal policy. Let us ﬁrst dispose of the
uninteresting latter case in which bH = b∗
L. The sponsor then should select an SSO with
cutoﬀ b∗
L, i.e., she should focus on skeptical users and ignore eager ones.27 Similarly, if
the sponsor does not try to appeal to skeptical types, and so bH = b∗
H, the SSO optimally
selects an SSO with cutoﬀ b∗
H.
More interestingly, suppose that aH + b∗




One implementation consists in applying to two SSOs. SSO i (i ∈ {L,H}) involves users
of type i and the sponsor and has objective function Ui + αiπ,w h e r e
a + bi + αiπi =0 .
It is then an equilibrium for SSOs to recommend adoption when b ≥ bi. When b<b L,
SSO H knows that SSO L will not recommend adoption. Hence, SSO H recommends
27If the SSO does not recommend adoption, even eager users will not adopt the standard as
aH + µ(−∞ , b∗
L) <a H + b∗
L < 0.
35adoption if and only if
aH + b + αHπH ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ b ≥ bH.
Similarly, when b>b H,S S OL knows that SSO H will recommend adoption. Hence, SSO
L recommends adoption if and only if
aL + b + αL (πL + πH) ≥ αLπH ⇐⇒ b ≥ bL = b
∗
L.
The implementation through two user-speciﬁc SSOs is by no means unique. Indeed,
the optimum can also be implemented through a single SSO, with preferences
π + βLUL + βHUH ,
where πL + βL (aL + b∗
L)=0and πH + βH (aH + bH)=0 .
Proposition 14 Suppose that users decompose into eager users (with utility aH +b)a n d
skeptical ones (with utility aL + b), and that user type is private information. In the
interesting case, in which the sponsor tries to attract both types of users, then
bL = b
∗
L where aL + m(b
∗
L)=0 .
Furthermore, and provided that aH + b∗
L > 0, then the eager types adopt if and only if
b ≥ bH with bH <b ∗




The optimal policy can be implemented either by using two user-speciﬁcS S O so re l s ea
single SSO defending both categories of users.
b) Strong network externalities: standards as multi-sided markets
Standards may be adopted by multiple groups of users. Indeed, sponsors often aim at
"getting multiple sides on board."28 For example, one key challenge faced by the MPEG2
28To use a standard expression from the multi-sided markets literature (e.g., Rochet-Tirole (2003)).
36standard was to attract both the consumer electronics and the computer manufactur-
ers groups, while providing sponsors with suﬃcient royalty income. The patent-holders
found the consumer electronics industry to be more comfortable with paying royalties for
patented material in standards and more focused on assuring interoperability and a criti-
cal mass of users. The computer industry was much more reluctant to license the patents,
having set standards on its own for many years and being accustomed to royalty-free
cross-licensing agreements between industry members.
Suppose that there are n groups of users, i =1 ,···,n, and that the standard is suc-
cessful (in which case the sponsor receives π) if and only if each of these n groups adopts
the standard (strong network externalities are present). In other words, the standard is
really adopted only if all user groups are taken on board. Leaving aside for the moment
licensing fees and other standard speciﬁcations, group i’s utility from adopting the stan-
dard (when the n−1 other groups adopt it as well) is ai+bi,w h e r e ,a se a r l i e r ,ai is known
and bi is not. The state of nature b =( b1,···,b n) is distributed according to some joint
distribution F (b). We assume that group i’s utility when it adopts and less than (n−1)
other groups adopt as well is always negative, so that it is not feasible to have less than
the full set of users adopt.
We ﬁrst ask whether the sponsor should go to n diﬀerent SSOs, for example each one
trusted by one speciﬁc user group, or to a single SSO. The need for coordination calls for
the use of a single SSO:
Proposition 15 It is optimal for the sponsor to apply to a single SSO.
Proof :L e tb =( b1,···,b n) and let X (b) denote the (present discounted) probability of





E [X (b)(ai + bi)] ≥ 0 for i =1 ,···,n.
37Letting βi denote the shadow prices of the constraints, the standard should be adopted
if and only if
π + Σ
n
i=1βi (ai + bi) ≥ 0.
The sponsor can reach this upper bound by applying to an SSO with relative weights
(1,β1,···,βn) on the sponsor and the users’ groups.
Applying to multiple SSOs (with "non-colinear" preferences) by contrast does not yield
this "interdependent" decision rule: For example, an SSO that would put relative weights
1 on the sponsor, βi on user group i, and 0 on the other user groups would recommend
adoption to group i if and only if π+βi (ai + bi) ≥ 0, regardless of the values of bj , j 6= i.
¥
Second, we generalize Proposition 9 to multiple groups of users (under strong network
externalities): If the sponsor can perfectly capture users’ surpluses through licensing fees,
then it is optimal for the sponsor to choose a balanced SSO. Furthermore, we provide
suﬃcient conditions under which the user groups who ﬁnd the technology least attractive
are charged less:
Proposition 16 Suppose that groups of users have diﬀerent ais, that the bisa r ei n d e p e n -
dently and identically distributed, and that the sponsor can discriminate in her choice of
licensing fees (p1,···,p n) to users. Then, provided that pi > 0 for all i
(i) the sponsor selects a balanced SSO (putting equal weight on all parties),
(ii) if the distribution F (b) is symmetrical, then the sponsor sets lower licensing fees to
groups that are more reluctant to adopt the standard; indeed, ai − pi is the same for all
groups.
Proof : The proof of part (i) of Proposition 16 is a simple extension of that of Proposition
9. Part (ii) results from the fact that pi = ai + E (bi |endorsement).B ys y m m e t r yo ft h e
distribution and given that βi =1for all i, the expectation of bi conditional on SSO
38endorsement is the same for all groups of users. ¥
c) The general case.
Consider an heterogeneous group with a large number (indeed a continuum) of mem-
bers indexed by i.29 Member i’s net utility from adopting the standard is
Ui(x)=a(x)+b − εi ,
where x ∈ [0,1] is the fraction of members adopting the standard, and the idiosyncratic
preference shock εi ∈ (−∞ , + ∞) is distributed according to some cumulative distribu-
tion G(·),w i t hd e n s i t yg(·). Positive network externalities correspond to a
0 (x) > 0.I n
order to abstract from technical complications arising from multiple equilibria, we will
assume that network externalities are not too strong: 1 >g(G−1 (x))a
0 (x) for all x.T h e
sponsor’s proﬁti sd e n o t e dπ(x) and is assumed to increase with x.
Consider the choice made by a SSO putting relative weight α on the sponsor’s interests.
Suppose that it endorses the standard whenever b ≥ b∗. Then user i adopts the standard
following the endorsement if and only if
a(x)+m(b
∗) − εi ≥ 0
and thus the fraction x of adopters is given by
x = G(a(x)+m(b
∗)),
which has a unique solution x∗ (increasing in m(b∗)) from our assumption). This yields









=[ a(x∗)+b − E(x∗)]x∗ + απ(x∗) ≥ 0
29The case of absence of network externalities (case a) corresponds to a(x) independent of x;t h a to f







x∗ is the average idiosyncratic shock of adoptors;






∗.( 1 5 )
Together, (14) and (15) deﬁne b∗ and x∗ for a given α.
Proposition 17 In the presence of user heterogeneity and network externalities,












(ii) an increase in the intensity of network externalities (i.e., an increase in a0(x∗) keeping
a(x∗) constant) calls for an application to a tougher SSO (a lower α).
Proof : (i) has already been proved. To prove (ii), note that the sponsor solves
max{[1 − F (b
∗)]π(x
∗)}
where b∗ and x∗ are given in (i). The result is obtained through diﬀerentiation. ¥
6 Competing standards and strategic forum shop-
ping
As we discussed, competition weakens the case for a given standard. If the rival technology
provides users with a known and positive utility, contemporaneous rivalry can be modeled
as a decrease in the strength a of the standard; potential future contestability can be
similarly analyzed as a reduction in a.
We now consider strategic forum shopping by two rival technologies (j =1 ,2). These
technologies, if adopted, deliver aj + bj to users and π to the sponsor, where as earlier
40aj is known and bj is not. Such rivalry raises a host of new and complex issues: Is it
still optimal for a sponsor to apply to a single SSO? Should an SSO still render a simple
(0/1) recommendation or should its opinion be expressed in a more sophisticated manner?
Should an SSO render a "myopic" opinion (that is, the recommendation it would issue
were the standard the unique possible one)? Will sponsors apply to separate SSOs or
t ot h es a m eo n e ?H o wa r es t r a t e g i e sa ﬀected by the similarity (correlation) of the two
technologies?
Let us analyze this rivalry in a simple symmetric example:




and X =P r
¡
b = b or b
¢
;
• users obtain utility a + bj when adopting standard j;
• in a ﬁrst step, we assume that the users would not want to adopt a standard with
type b: a + b < 0; however,
a + m(b)=a +
(X − x)b + xb
X
> 0;
• if users perceive two technologies to have equal (and positive) merit, they choose
between the two randomly with equal probabilities.
We will say that an SSO is friendly if, on a stand alone basis, it accepts standard b
(i.e., a+b+απ ≥ 0)a n dtough if it accepts only standard b (a+b+απ > 0 >a+b+απ).
It is never optimal in this example for a sponsor to apply to both a tough and a
friendly SSO, if there is at least an inﬁnitesimal cost of application: it obtains the same
certiﬁcation as when it applies only to a tough SSO if it gets accredited by both; on the
other hand, the condition a + b < 0 implies that the technology is never adopted if it is
not accepted by the tough SSO.
Monopoly standard.
The monopoly benchmark has the sponsor apply to a friendly SSO as
Xπ >x π.
41Two rival standards.
There are three potential pure-strategy equilibria of the forum-shopping game between
the standard duopolists:
a) Both apply to a tough SSO.









A sponsor who would take the less ambitious strategy of applying to a friendly SSO would
get:
X (1 − x)π.







≥ X (1 − x).( 1 6 )
b) Both apply to a friendly SSO.









while she would obtain xπ by deviating and applying to a tough SSO. This F-submission









The sponsor applying to the tough SSO obtains xπ. From the previous analysis, she
















, that she would obtain by deviating and applying to a tough
SSO. Hence, this diﬀerentiated submissions equilibrium equilibrium also requires that:30






.( 1 9 )
It can be shown that in this equilibrium the sponsor applying to a tough SSO is better
oﬀ than his less ambitious rival. We thus obtain three regions. Fixing the probability X,
and increasing x toward X,31 ﬁrst both apply to friendly SSOs, then the sponsors follow
diﬀerentiated strategies, and ﬁnally both apply to tough SSOs.
Let us next assume that a+b > 0.W h e na+b > 0, then sponsors may apply to both
a tough and a friendly SSO in equilibrium. Because we assumed away application costs
(or else posited small ones), applying to both dominates applying only to a tough SSO;
for the sponsor thereby gets a "second chance" if her technology is rejected by the tough
SSO.
By contrast, applying to both types of SSO does not necessarily dominate applying
solely to a friendly SSO because of the by-now familiar stigma attached to being rejected
by a tough SSO. Indeed, it is easily seen that the equilibrium is unique and:










Figure 2 summarizes the analysis.32
30There exists also a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium besides the two pure-strategy ones.
31x cannot start quite at 0 from the condition a + m(b) > 0.
32x1 , x2 and x3 are given by:
a +
(X − x1)b + x1b
X
=0 ,
43Numerous examples exist where sponsors of competing standards have chosen similar
or diﬀerent strategies when selecting SSOs. As an example of a diﬀerentiated strategy,
manufacturers of asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) equipment chose to develop their
standard for ATM over multi-protocol label switching based networks within their ATM
Forum, while the IETF was pursuing a similar project simultaneously. Some observers
suggested that the ATM Forum’s approach was to essentially clone the functionality of
ATM when it ran on dedicated ATM switches to other settings. While this was conve-
nient for the manufacturers, the decision led to added complexity and cost for the network
operators. As an example of sponsors choosing very similar strategies, multiple sponsors
of wireless Internet connectivity standards applied to the Institute of Electrical and Elec-
tronic Engineers (IEEE), where their proposals were considered by diﬀerent committees
within the 802.11 group.















= X (1 − x3).
Note that x1 depends on a,a n dt h a tf o ra+b negative, but converging to 0, the left-handside T-submission
region vanishes.
When a + b < 0 and x<x 1, the equilibrium is a T-submission one since a + m(b) < 0 in this region.
44is a zero-sum game (from their point of view). The probability that one of the standards
is adopted is 1 − (1 − X)
2 and is independent of their forum shopping strategies. Users,
though, are not indiﬀerent. They are always better oﬀ when they take better informed
decisions, i.e., when sponsors engage in dual submissions. The equilibrium payoﬀsa r e
then unique, a well-known property of zero-sum games.
By contrast, when a + b < 0, the game between the sponsors no longer is a zero-
sum game. Going for an endorsement by a tough SSO reduces the overall probability of
adoption of a standard, and therefore must come at the expense of the rival sponsors’
welfare. This negative externality on the rival sponsor gives rise to "holier-than-thou"
strategies, or a form of "prisoner’s dilemma”. Again, this is all seen from the sponsors’
perspective. Users prefer sponsors to apply to tough SSOs.
Last, comparing the behavior of a sponsor when she faces no competition and when she
does, note that standards competition always leads to applications to weakly less friendly
SSOs. The "weakly" in the previous sentence is actually an artifact of the discreteness
of this version of the model. Indeed, if as in the rest of the paper, we had assumed that
b is continuous, it is easy to see that both sponsors’ applying to SSOs with type α∗ (a)
(giving rise to cut-oﬀ b∗ such that a + m(b∗)=0 ) is not an equilibrium. Either sponsor
would gain by deviating and applying to a slightly less friendly SSO. The probability of
endorsement would be slightly smaller but in case of endorsement, the standard would be
perceived as slightly superior to the rival standard and therefore adopted for sure.33
Proposition 18 Under standards competition,
• the sponsors apply to less friendly (more credible) SSOs than they would if they were
monopolists,
• the sponsors may apply to a single SSO or to multiple ones,
• equilibrium behavior is summarized in Figure 1.
33This reasoning is reminiscent of the "overtaking" arguments in Damiano-Li (2003) and Bénabou-
Tirole (2004).
457C o n c l u s i o n
This paper examines ﬁrms’ choices of intermediaries who can certify their property or
ideas. While the problem arises in many aspects of economic life, we focus on the setting in
which a ﬁrm is seeking the endorsement of a standard-setting organization for a proposed
new technical standard.
The paper considers the choice between potential certiﬁers as a three-stage game:
choice of certiﬁer, endorsement, adoption. We highlight a number of conclusions:
• In a wide range of circumstances, sponsors will select only one SSO from which to
receive certiﬁcation, even when they are trying to get multiple sides on board.
• There is a negative relationship between the strength of proposed standard and
credibility of the SSO selected by the sponsor to certify the standard.
• More extensive concessions to users will be made when the proposed standard is
weaker.
• From a social welfare point of view, the sponsor of an attractive technology chooses
an SSO that is too complacent and makes too few concessions in the design (unless
she can perfectly capture the users’ surplus through royalties). In case of a less
attractive standard, regulation cannot improve on the sponsor’s choices of SSO and
design.
• An SSO that is more user-friendly than the sponsor would wish can engage in
technology morphing. Its ability to do so, however, may be limited if the standard
is only mildly attractive, as the required bargaining delays convey a negative signal
about the standard.
• Independent users beneﬁt when the sponsor has a stronger downstream presence.
• Standards competition induces sponsors to apply to more credible SSOs.
46This paper is, in many respects, only a ﬁrst pass at modeling the choice and behavior
of SSOs. One line of research would open the black box behind their preferences. In
our model, the parameter α weighing the certiﬁer’s preferences over user and sponsor
welfare was meant to reﬂect various dimensions of SSO governance, such as decision-
making processes and composition of relevant committees, as well as their technological
preferences. Another aspect worth investigating relates to the SSO’s reputation-building
process and the concomitant entry and exit dynamics in the SSO industry. Yet another
topic of research would consist in introducing (endogenous) delays in SSO internal decision
making and looking at their implications for the certiﬁcation strategies of competing
sponsors. Finally, while we have obtained some interesting results on both technology
morphing and standards competition, our analysis only touches on the associated issues
and ought to be extended in many directions such as the melding of multiple standards
i n t oas i n g l eo n e .W el e a v et h e s et o p i c sa n do t h e r sf o rf u t u r er e s e a r c h .
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